Iran-linked Operators Suspected in ATG Breaches

ICS Exposures
Iran, Research, Threat Intelligence

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Introduction

This report follows CNN’s 15 May 2026 report that US officials suspect Iran-linked operators of breaching internet-facing Automatic Tank Gauges (ATGs) at US gas stations. Censys finds 6,502 ATG services on 6,057 hosts (excluding hosts where any service is labeled HONEYPOT) still reachable on the public internet today. Every ATG service indexed in Censys is reachable without authentication. The protocol has no login. A single unauthenticated I20100 command returns the station’s brand, street address, phone number, and live tank readings on 60.1% of these services.


Executive Summary

  • 6,502 ATG services on 6,057 hosts in 65+ countries, May 2026. Honeypots excluded.
  • 3,907 services (60.1%) leak a full I20100 in-tank inventory: station brand, name, address, sometimes a phone number, and live volume / ullage / water-bottom readings.
  • United States: 4,224 hosts (70%). Considered separately, Puerto Rico is second at 350 hosts, of which 347 sit on a single ISP (COQUI-NET / DATACOM CARIBE). Top US ASNs are residential and small-business broadband and cellular ISPs: Verizon Wireless / CELLCO-PART (667), Comcast / CMCS (373), CYBERA Inc. (281), Charter / CHARTER-20115 (241), AT&T (208), UUNET / Verizon Business (171). Comcast and Charter each appear under multiple ASNs in the long tail.
  • Notable brands found running ATG: Shell (602), Mobil (184), BP (78), Texaco (68), Puma (52, LatAm), Marathon (47), Exxon (41), Sunoco (37), Gulf (32), Citgo (31), Chevron (23), Valero (23).
  • Per CNN (15 May 2026), US officials suspect Iran-linked operators behind a recent run of ATG intrusions across US gas stations. Attackers reached devices “sitting online and unprotected by passwords” and altered on-display readings. Investigators emphasize they could not change physical fuel levels, but the same access, by protocol design, could let a leak go undetected.

Threat Activity

Per CNN (15 May 2026), US officials suspect Iran-linked operators behind recent intrusions against unprotected, internet-facing ATGs at US gas stations. Attackers reached devices “sitting online and unprotected by passwords” and altered on-display readings. Physical fuel levels were not changed, but the same access channel would permit masking a real leak.

3,907 of those 6,502 exposed services openly broadcast the station’s brand, street address, and on-site phone number. For a targeted adversary, the reconnaissance is already done.


What the Protocol Leaks

The ATG protocol-level I20100 response is a printer-formatted in-tank inventory report that begins with the station’s brand and street address before the tank table: “SHELL 135102 / 90 E.HWY 246 / BUELLTON, CA”, “MOBIL RIO HONDO / Comerío, Puerto Rico”, “Friendly Shell / Lexington, KY”.


Shell-branded consoles alone account for 602 reachable hosts, more than the next ten major chains in this enumeration combined. Mobil follows at 184, BP at 78, Texaco at 68, Marathon at 47, Exxon at 41.

Geography

US ATG hosts by state. Texas’s outsized share partly reflects Verizon Wireless’s BGP egress (Euless, TX).

Top US states: Texas (713), California (312), Illinois (287), Pennsylvania (212), New York (199).

Beyond US states: Puerto Rico (350; 347 on COQUI-NET / DATACOM CARIBE), Brazil (273), Australia (175), Uruguay (102), Canada (100), Spain (95).