Executive summary

  • On November 16, 2026, poisoned third-party scripts delivered a card skimmer and a cryptocurrency clipper to visitors of major websites, including the BBC, Zoom, and CNN.
  • Censys linked the campaign’s infrastructure to a related cluster: a control panel titled MCH 管控平台, an iOS exploit backend branded 财神 (Caishen), and cryptocurrency “energy rental” storefronts.
  • As of November 17, 2026, Censys observed the panel title on 142 web properties, the Caishen backend title on 144, and the storefront title on 55. These counts cover multiple deployment versions.
  • Optimizely’s status page states that an unauthorized party exploited a vulnerability in its Experimentation product to add malicious JavaScript to some customer projects, and that the vulnerability is fixed, the injected code removed, and the affected accounts secured. Reporting ties the same loader to other third-party libraries, including Kissmetrics, StorifyMe, and minute-ly.
  • Both staging hosts and the implant C2 host went offline on November 17, 2026, within hours of disclosure. Within about a day, the operator had five new MCH panel hosts live on NETSEC-HK (AS45753), and the kit vendor re-listed the package on GitHub.
  • The channel code 02111110 shared by the loader and skimmer is the kit’s hard-coded default: it links the campaign’s components to one control panel, but identifies no specific operator, and over a hundred deployments of this kit carry it.
  • Staging started on November 9, 2026, a week before the theft. Tron and Ethereum proceeds moved through commercial services within hours of receipt.

What happened on November 16?

Following reports about malware spreading through popular websites, Censys noticed visitor browsers contacting multiple recently registered domains. To observe who reached those domains and what they collected, Censys sinkholed them starting on November 16, 2026. Hudson Rock provided the first report on this campaign of malicious code being delivered by multiple third-party libraries, Optimizely among them. Amirul Cyber tracked the same injection as OPTIMJACK. Based on referrers to our sinkholing, we can confirm the reported impacted sites include BBC, Zoom, CNN, DoorDash, Zillow, Fox News, and GitLab. The malicious code delivered by these sites uses a known iOS exploitation toolkit – Caishen, to deliver subsequent payloads related to Coruna and Darksword. Visitors on phones and tablets get the exploit chain. Visitors on desktop systems get a card skimmer, a cryptocurrency clipper, and page-data theft instead.

The injected code arrives through embedded third-party scripts. For example, on zoom[.]com, Censys captured an Optimizely script at cdn.optimizely[.]com loading a JavaScript file – track.js from the domain 1688360[.]cc, which starts the exploitation chain. Censys deep web scanning records show the same track.js javascript on at least 30 sites as of November 16.

Optimizely addressed the injection on its status page at 01:02 UTC on November 17, 2026. The company stated that an unauthorized party exploited a vulnerability in its Experimentation product to add malicious JavaScript to some customer projects, and that it has fixed the vulnerability, removed the injected code, and secured the affected accounts. That statement covers one delivery vendor. Reporting and Censys data tie the same loader route to other third-party libraries, including Kissmetrics on November 13, StorifyMe, and minute-ly.

Figure 1: The Optimizely project script loading track.js from 1688360[.]cc


The 29 KB track.js payload combines four mechanisms:

  • Card skimmer. track.js runs on every page the script loads, not only at checkout. It hooks form submissions and input fields, collects anything that looks like a card number, expiry, or CVV, and validates the number with a Luhn check, before sending it with the page URL to /card.php. On a site like zoom[.]com, the fields exist only on payment pages, so a visitor’s card is captured when a payment form on that site is submitted.
  • Cryptocurrency clipper. The script replaces any copied cryptocurrency addresses in a user’s clipboard with eight hardcoded wallets, one per chain: Ethereum, Bitcoin, Litecoin, Bitcoin Cash, Tron, TON, Solana, and Dogecoin.
  • Page-data exfiltration. The script posts the page URL, up to 8,000 characters of cookies, and a picture of the page as the visitor’s browser renders it, taken with a browser-side screenshot library, to /hit.php. Both exfiltration endpoints live on the same 1688360[.]cc host that serves track.js.
  • iOS staging. On iPhone, iPad, and touch-screen Mac user agents, the script loads boot.js from two payload domains. On iOS 18.6 and earlier, it also embeds a hidden iframe that loads a page from eil786npto9u5bq[.]icu.
  • Non-iOS visitors. Everyone else just gets the card skimmer, clipper, and page-data exfiltration. The exploit chain never loads.

The same iOS loader also reached pages by a second route that skips the skimmer. A 400-byte script at webshell[.]lol/get.js adds a script tag pointing at 5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu/boot.js to any page that runs it. The script has no device check, so every browser that loads the page fetches boot.js. Both the skimmer and this loader set the channel code 02111110 on the script tag they add.

Timeline

Censys scan history, certificate records, and public blockchain records date the operation. All times are UTC.

DateEvent 
April 3, 2024The loader domain webshell[.]lol is registered.
November 9, 2026The first payload server, 34.96.213[.]201, appears in Censys scan history with three .icu domains on one certificate.
November 12, 2026The campaign’s Ethereum wallet receives its first seed payment.
November 13, 2026Page scans record boot.js served from 5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu and the loader running on third-party pages.
November 14, 2026A second staging server, 34.124.226[.]157, appears with five domains in the same random-character style as the first server’s. It shares an SSH banner hash and a metrics service on port 20201 with the first.
November 16, 2026, 05:04A certificate is issued for the delivery domain 1688360[.]cc.
November 16, 2026, 08:25The first page scan records an affected site loading the delivery domain. Wallet receipts start at 10:31.
November 16, 2026, 13:05546.8 USDT, a dollar-pegged stablecoin, moves from the Tron wallet to a high-volume aggregator address.
November 16, 2026, 21:14A Censys capture of zoom[.]com still loads track.js. A capture of bbc[.]com at 21:22 contacts no campaign domain.
November 17, 2026, 01:02Optimizely publishes its statement on the Experimentation vulnerability.
November 17, 2026, 03:30-05:22The campaign’s two staging hosts and the implant C2 host go offline.
November 17, 2026, 04:11-04:13The Litecoin and Tron wallets are swept to the operator’s recurring destination.

The collection endpoint /hit.php still answered with HTTP 204 at about 21:55 on November 16, 2026.

The campaign’s infrastructure did not last long past disclosure. Both staging hosts and the implant C2 host went offline between 03:30 and 05:22 UTC on November 17, 2026. Within about 24 hours, a block of five new MCH panel hosts running build DRYPnrzh went live on NETSEC-HK (AS45753). The kit vendor re-listed DarkSword-27.1 packages on GitHub the next morning under a new Telegram contact, t.me/h8e888. The Litecoin wallet was swept at 04:11 UTC and the Tron wallet at 04:13 UTC to the operator’s recurring TMLQ destination, matching the historical sweep cadence. The Bitcoin wallet was untouched.

Censys ARC perspective

This is how Censys ARC sees the campaign, based on our scan data. Rather than developing bespoke tooling for this campaign, the operator used existing infrastructure. The loader was likely rented, and the iPhone exploit kit matches a public dump. The control panel is a product that other servers also run. Figure 2 shows each piece and how a visitor moves through them.

Figure 2: Campaign architecture, showing who generates, serves, and deploys what

The campaign’s first payload server, 34.96.213[.]201, presents one certificate for three random-string .icu domains. One of them, 5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu, served the iOS stage loader. A second domain, je4ft3gn8vxudum[.]icu, serves an administrative interface at /admin/ titled MCH 管控平台, which translates to “MCH control platform”. 

The service host

The same panel title appears on 64.83.19[.]114, a host in Los Angeles on AS979. We tie it to this campaign by its kit configuration rather than by the title alone: the host’s pages carry the same channel code 02111110 and the same energy-rental config hash as the campaign’s service deployments, and it exposes the whole stack on adjacent ports:

PortObserved 
8080MCH 管控平台 control panel at /admin/
8081财神iOS漏洞后台, “Caishen iOS exploit backend”, a Vben Admin 5.8.0 build with a Baidu analytics counter
8082A TRX energy-rental storefront
8083An unlisted page with a module-map stage loader
8090An energy-rental landing page with an injector block that loads boot.js from port 8001

Figure 3: Services on 64.83.19[.]114

A second deployment runs on 8.208.35[.]123, an Alibaba Cloud host in London. It serves the same landing page and injector block. Its hostnames follow a role scheme: mch.jndft28[.]xyz, c2.jndft28[.]xyz, land.jndft28[.]xyz, and api.o45qhw6g17bwhdy[.]icu.

The MCH panel appears in two places. On the service host, it runs next to the exploit backend, the storefronts, and the stage loader. On the campaign server, 34.96.213[.]201, it shares a certificate with the domain that served the iOS loader. Based on that overlap, Censys ARC assesses with moderate confidence that operators use the panel to manage these deployments.

The generator and the default channel code

Both landing pages carry the same injector block. Its comment names the tool that built it:

// 引流配置 – 由 patch_domains.py 生成

The comment translates to “traffic-diversion config, generated by patch_domains.py”. The block sets DEFAULT_CH = '02111110'. It reads a per-source code from the ch, channelCode, channel, or c URL parameter, and falls back to the default. The campaign’s loader and skimmer carry that default. Any deployment that sets no per-source code carries it too, so a match does not identify the operator.

The campaign’s payload domains, the staging siblings, and names on both service deployments are random 15-character .icu domains. Censys ARC assesses with moderate confidence that the same tooling generated them.

The stage loader on port 8083

Port 8083 on the service host serves an unlisted page. Its inline script decodes a Base64 module map, installs a global dispatcher, and fetches content-hashed stage files by URL. Hudson Rock describes the same dispatch structure on the campaign’s delivery pages, where it loaded stages routed by iOS version.

Deployed base

Censys Platform users can find each tier by page title:

web.endpoints.http.html_title=”MCH 管控平台”

web.endpoints.http.html_title=”财神iOS漏洞后台”

web.endpoints.http.html_title=”能量租赁 – 24小时无人值守极速到账”

As of November 17, 2026:

MeasurementObserved 
MCH control panel title142 web properties
Panel body, byte-identical19 web properties share one body hash
Panel version stringmch-v5-5.7.0-prod
Caishen iOS exploit backend title144 web properties
Cryptocurrency “energy rental” storefronts title55 web properties

The matching properties span unrelated hosting providers and registrants. A shared version string indicates one release deployed by many operators. The November campaign accounts for three hosts and their domains, listed under Indicators.

Wallet activity

Public blockchain records show no activity on the Ethereum wallet before November 12:

  • Ethereum:  a 0.0192 ETH seed on November 12. 4,310.82 USDC left by direct transfer on November 16, after the wallet approved the amount to a swap contract earlier that day.
  • Tron: 50 lifetime transactions; 10 on 16 November beginning 10:31 UTC. 546.8 USDT moved to an aggregator address at 13:05.
  • Bitcoin: five payments on November 16, totaling 0.0853 BTC. Unspent at 22:00.
  • Litecoin: three payments on November 16, totaling 17.02 LTC. Unspent at 22:00.
  • Dogecoin: no activity.
  • Bitcoin Cash, Solana, and TON: no activity observed.

The Ethereum funding address and the Tron aggregator each handle thousands of transfers a day, which indicates commercial services.

The energy-rental kit publishes its own Tron deposit address. That address matches none of the campaign’s wallets.

The loader vendor

The loader domain webshell[.]lol predates the campaign by two years. Its root page advertises webshells and black-hat SEO services under the handle BIBILZERODAY . The handle’s Telegram channel has 13 subscribers and one substantive post. That post, dated November 9, moves customer contact to the Session messenger. The first payload server appeared in Censys scan history the same day.

Censys ARC assesses with moderate confidence that the campaign operator rented the loader from this vendor. The evidence does not show that the vendor and operator are the same person.

Hunting MCH and Caishen with Censys

  • Panel: the MCH title query. The same title appears across deployments with different generated domains.
  • Exploit backend and storefronts: the two title queries above.
  • Page content: the strings patch_domains and 引流配置 in a served page mark the generator.
  • Channel code: data-channel-code=”02111110″ on a script tag marks the kit’s default configuration.
  • Domain pattern: random 15-character .icu names that serve boot.js.
  • Containment: to remove the injection, remove the injected project code. Hudson Rock reports an embedded fallback payload that runs when the delivery host is blocked.

Indicators

Campaign infrastructure, reported publicly and confirmed in Censys data:

IndicatorsContext 
1688360[.]cc136.113.106[.]136Delivery domain and host: track.js, /card.php, /hit.php
f7b84b9a94f749f8ced3f0112d0a66894e8bbc3b4aa5592021d1b8976a9bad40SHA-256 of track.js, captured twice on November 16
webshell[.]lolLoader vendor domain
123f813b18cf5a3b513beabd52a110e19f1c7834f2aa9b972633b2214c57e737SHA-256 of the loader get.js
5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icueil786npto9u5bq[.]icuPayload domains for the iOS stages
je4ft3gn8vxudum[.]icuMCH control panel under the campaign certificate
p55abnw2pnsz0bo[.]icuThird name on the campaign certificate
34.96.213[.]201First staging server, first observed November 9, 2026
34.124.226[.]157Second staging server, first observed November 14, 2026
3601688[.]cc6xicduvopkxpyev[.]icuhrufvf7xb3ntctm[.]icuryf3e5p7rf8slv8[.]icusl6zirn8wu7kggn[.]icuso23nhowskohk67[.]icuSibling domains on the second staging server
5698e9c039ab875e195b0b39ed57b9c10d200b341ab98f6bc489407cf03f8ecaSHA-256 of the campaign’s payload certificate
2feaff817ad1214f0de69b6b25595e2a92320c77325eecdeed0ad87a675e71a7SHA-256 of the delivery domain’s certificate
64.83.19[.]114Service host: MCH control panel on 8080, Caishen iOS exploit backend on 8081, storefronts on 8082 and 8090, stage loader on 8083
8.208.35[.]123Second service deployment: energy-rental landing page with the generated injector block
api.o45qhw6g17bwhdy[.]icuPayload host named in the injector block on the second deployment; serves boot.js
mch.jndft28[.]xyzResolves to 8.208.35[.]123; the label matches the MCH control panel
c2.jndft28[.]xyzResolves to 8.208.35[.]123; the label indicates command and control
land.jndft28[.]xyzResolves to 8.208.35[.]123; the label indicates a landing-page host
go.jndft28[.]xyzResolves to 8.208.35[.]123; role unconfirmed
admin.o45qhw6g17bwhdy[.]icuResolves to 8.208.35[.]123; the label indicates an administrative interface
hhflwcie7xif2vo[.]icunamv99cyrwjsd1q[.]icuGenerated domains on the TLS certificate of 8.208.35[.]123
0q0nf736x5lcbf3[.]icuGenerated domain that resolves to 8.208.35[.]123
TBHmGSLDFFF26DYaet2j91LWkTtRjmXPqFTron deposit address published by the energy-rental kit

Clipper replacement wallets, from the deobfuscated payload:

ChainWallet 
Ethereum and EVM0xC4026b06D82b0F0B363eda0642D61CfbDc17884e
TronTHvs6p56XkUiMkJeSc51cAP64u2RsTYqxa
Bitcoin19g9rZcPeiz8rUvyWpTRyXXhPnjsWrc3kW
Litecoinltc1q3wp7g6ds0ggg6fl6kncpa4sepn0q3qfacgred5
Bitcoin Cashqzkaaf8n6grmpr0d9lx8xutn3r9lk722f566hhpe58
SolanaFVtL8NMYS9PA1v3HE67XUGCtGA9JaZUvqav2fU2LrV5n
DogecoinDBEGrxRF7KMSuhTS4c1MFviStU6efdMnu5
TON, user-friendly formUQAgM1VqSZQiJLSG5w-ovurq5CZdxLEK3_7CMmwALTA5e09p
TON, raw form of the same wallet0:2033556a49942224b486e70fa8beeaeae4265dc4b10adffec2326c002d30397b

References

A young man with blonde hair wearing a blue shirt outdoors with greenery and pink blossoms in the background.
AUTHOR
Aidan Holland
Senior Security Researcher

Aidan Holland is a Senior Security Researcher with Censys ARC, where he specializes in threat intelligence and internet-wide security research. His work focuses on identifying and analyzing malicious infrastructure, tracking threat actors, and developing tools for security analysis at scale. Aidan is an active contributor to the open source security community, building and maintaining tools for threat hunting, data analysis, and security automation.

A man with long blonde hair, a mustache and goatee, wearing a dark suit and black shirt, against a blue background.
AUTHOR
Andrew Northern
Principal Security Researcher

Andrew Northern is a Principal Security Researcher with Censys ARC focused on tracking the apex predators of the initial-access e-crime landscape. His work targets the most capable operators, uncovering novel attack chains and dynamic web-delivered malware while mapping the infrastructure that enables them. He has earned multiple MITRE ATT&CK citations, discovered and named several espionage-focused malware families, and published research that exposes previously unknown tradecraft.

A young man with short brown hair, wearing a headset microphone, looks attentively against a colorful, illuminated
AUTHOR
Silas Cutler
Principal Security Researcher

Silas Cutler is a Principal Security Researcher with Censys ARC where he focuses on tracking organized cyber-crime groups. Silas brings over a decade of experience investigating and responding to incidents such as Solarwinds, Shamoon, WannaCry, and other destructive attacks.